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ABSTRACT
Steganography has long been regarded as a tool used for illicit and destructive
purposes such as crime and warfare. Currently, digital tools are widely available to
ordinary computer users also. Steganography software allows both illicit and
legitimate users to hide messages so that they will not be detected in transit. This
article provides a brief history of steganography, discusses the current status in the
computer age, and relates this to forensic, security, and legal issues. The paper
concludes with recommendations for digital forensics investigators, IT staff,
individual users, and other stakeholders.
Keywords: steganography, data hiding, information hiding, digital forensics,
computer law, computer security, steganalysis, privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is the process of hiding information. In the digital realm,
steganography (which literally means “covered writing”), involves hiding data or
messages in digital files. The files themselves may appear to be innocuous, and
would be ignored by a casual observer or even by authorities. The field of
information hiding has grown sufficiently in recent years. Evidence of this growth
can be seen at workshops on information hiding, and in occasional reports of use
by criminals and terrorists appear in the popular press. In contrast to cryptography
where the message is encoded, the purpose of steganography is to hide the fact that
a message is being sent. Once encoded, a cryptographically altered message
typically appears unrecognizable and would raise suspicions. The primary
advantage of steganography over cryptography is that the “covertext” (apparent
messages) do not attract attention to themselves, to messengers, or to recipients.
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Modern information technology enables novice computer users to hide, transmit,
and unhide steganographic messages without special expertise. (Warkentin, et al,
2006) The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: A brief history (Section
2) is followed by an introduction to steganography (3), with contrasts to
encryption, and an introduction to steganalysis (4). The following three sections
focus on forensics issues (5), security issues (6), and legal issues (7). Section 8 has
conclusions and recommendations for researchers and practitioners.
2. BRIEF HISTORY
2.1 Ancient Greece and Rome
Steganography has a long history, going back to the ancient Greek and Roman
civilizations. Herodotus, the Greek historian, reports how king Darius shaved the
head of a prisoner and wrote a secret message on his scalp. After the hair grew
back, the prisoner was sent to the king’s son-in-law Aristogoras in Miletus and
effectively delivering the message undetected by the enemy. A less timeconsuming method of delivering secret messages was used by a soldier named
Demeratus who needed to send a message to Sparta that king Xerxes planned to
invade Greece. Demeratus removed the wax from a writing tablet, wrote the
message on the underlying wood, and re-applied the wax. Both examples explain
why the word steganography is based on the Greek word for “covered writing”
(steganos = unseen or hidden; graphia = writing): protection of the message is
assured not through making the message undecipherable, but by hiding the
existence of the message altogether. Sending undecipherable messages is the
technique of cryptography (kryptos = hidden or secret), and both techniques are
often used in conjunction. The Romans accomplished the goal of sending
messages undetected by writing between the lines of innocuous documents with
invisible ink made from fluids like milk, urine and fruit juices. When the document
was heated, the invisible ink would darken and become visible.
2.2 Middle Ages
At the end of the Middle Ages, two authors produced seminal works on
steganography. Johannes Trithemius (1462-1526) wrote the three volumes of
Steganographia (ca. 1499) which superficially describe black magic, specifically
using spirits to communicate over long distances. However, by deciphering the
text with a simple substitution method, one can read treatises on both cryptography
and steganography. More than a century later, Gaspari Schotti picked up where
Trithemius left off and published Steganographia (1665), which focuses on
techniques with text, invisible inks, and incorporating hidden messages in music.
2.3 More Recent History
In the mid 19th century, a global technology revolution dramatically altered
information transmission speed so that what took days or weeks to convey (at the
speed of ships and horses) could be achieved in minutes with the new telegraph.
Almost immediately, businesses and individuals sought to conceal their true
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message from telegraph operators, especially when the messages might be
sensitive or might convey strategic business information. Some messages were
simply enciphered, but others were creatively disguised using various
steganographic schemes to prevent telegraph operators from becoming suspicious.
(Standage, 1999)
In the late 19th century, Lord Baden-Powell was employed as a scout by the
British army. To hide his drawings of positions of Boer artillery bases, he hid maps
in drawings of butterflies. Certain markings on the wings of the butterflies were
actually enemy installation positions. Thus, he would not be suspected even if he
were caught. Hiding messages was further perfected by the German invention of
the microdot, where photographs the size of printed periods contain images of
standard size pages. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover labeled this as “the enemy’s
masterpiece of espionage.” Other advancements during World War I included the
advent of null ciphers, where unencrypted messages about ordinary events contain
hidden messages. For instance, the following message sent by the German
embassy in Washington, DC, to their headquarters in Berlin “Apparently neutral's
protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman hard hit. Blockade issue
affects pretext for embargo on by-products, ejecting suets and vegetable oils” can
be decoded by taking the second letter of each word, and results in “Pershing sails
from NY June 1”. (Kahn, 1996) As evidenced by comparing the message sizes,
this technique was relatively inefficient. Additionally, some of these messages are
nonsensical, and therefore may raise suspicions.
2.4 Computer Age
The advent of the digital computer has introduced new opportunities for hiding
messages, but also new challenges for forensic investigation. International
workshops on information hiding and steganography have been held regularly
since 1996 (Moulin and O’Sullivan, 2003), however, the majority of development
and use of computerized steganography has occurred since 2000 (Cole, 2003). The
use of steganography is now well within the reach of an average person with a
computer and an Internet connection (Bartlett, 2003), and the most recent
development is the potential use of steganography in Internet Telephony systems
such as Skype (Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski, 2008).
3. DIGITAL STEGANOGRAPHY
3.1 Definitions
In the modern computer age, technology has enabled the embedding of hidden
messages efficiently and easily. Computerized tools encode the message and hide
it within another file. Johnson (2008) defines steganography as “the art of
concealing the existence of information within seemingly innocuous carriers” and
adds that “an encrypted message may draw suspicion while a hidden message will
not.” Thus, the goal is to conceal that the fact that the message even exists in the
first place (Anderson and Petitcolas, 1998), so that anyone intercepting and
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viewing the file (image, document, e-mail, etc.) would not be readily aware of the
hidden bits. In the 1996 Information Hiding Workshop in Cambridge (Pfitzmann,
1996), the following terminology in steganography was defined. The embedded
data is the information to be hidden in the cover, the original, innocent file such as
an image, audio, text, or video. The process itself is labeled embedding, and the
cover and embedded data together form the stego data.
As mentioned earlier, both steganography and cryptography intend to hide
information. Steganography hides the existence of the message, cryptography
makes the message impossible to understand for outsiders, and both are often used
together. Whereas cryptographic messages by themselves are easily identifiable by
their random and unintelligible appearance, steganography messages appear to be
normal at first sight. The combined use of steganography and cryptography can
effectively provide a message sender two levels of protection.
Another related technology is watermarking, where digital files are visibly or
invisibly marked with embedded information. For the sake of completeness, we
will briefly discuss some cryptographic definitions and principles as they relate to
steganography, compare steganography and watermarking, and focus the
remainder of the paper only on steganography and related issues.
The classical principles of cryptography were defined by the Dutch linguist
Auguste Kerckhoff (1883) as:


the system should be, if not theoretically unbreakable, unbreakable in
practice,



the design of a system should not require secrecy,



compromise of the system should not inconvenience the
correspondents,



the key should be memorable without notes and should be easily
changeable,



the cryptograms should be transmittable by telegraph,



the apparatus or documents should be portable and operable by a
single person, and



the system should be easy, theater requiring knowledge of a long list
of rules nor involving mental strain.

Clearly, some of these principles still apply today. Like steganography,
cryptography has significantly improved both in use and in decryption since the
advent of the modern computer. Ciphers are more complex, and any type of data
can be converted in binary format. Separately and in combination, the techniques
have been of great interest to the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
We will address some of these issues in a later section.
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In watermarking, the object of the communication is not in the embedded message
but in the carrier itself. The watermark only serves to uniquely identify the carrier.
This can be overt as a deterrent to digital copying, or hidden as proof of ownership
and origin. Television broadcast companies routinely include a visible watermark
in their programming, and copyright protection systems use invisible watermarks.
This indicates the need for inseparability of watermark and carrier, since removal
of the (visible or invisible) watermark destroys the deterrence to copying and proof
of ownership. A special problem for both steganography and watermarking is the
conversion of digital files to different formats or with different compression levels.
Both can affect the embedded information, and the technology needs to be robust
against this type of attack and signal modification. For example, only lossless
compression algorithms (e.g. GIF, not JPEG) are appropriate for steganographic
concealment, because the embedded data may become altered otherwise. Certain
transmission protocols may also compress the signal in ways that could
compromise the ability to discover the embedded data by the recipient. Finally,
whereas steganographic content can lose significance when information becomes
outdated or stale, watermarks retain their significance indefinitely. A brief
comparison of the three technologies is included as Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of Steganography, Cryptography, and
Watermarking
Technique

Purpose

Comments

Steganography

Hiding existence of digital
content from outsiders

Content generally of
limited time value.
Needs carrier file

Cryptography

Rendering the digital content
inaccessible to outsiders

Content generally of
limited time value.
No need for carrier file

Watermarking

Protection of digital content
of carrier

May or may not be
readily detectable.
Durability is essential

For the purposes of this paper, the remainder of the discussion will focus only on
steganography.
3.2 Types of Steganography
The hidden content of stego messages can be embedded in the carrier file by three
types of methods. The stego message can be injected inside the carrier, which does
not alter the digital content of the carrier itself. Alternatively, part of the digital
carrier content can be substituted with the stego message. The latter does change
the digital content of the carrier. A relatively new method of hiding content is to
use the stego message to generate a completely new file. Examples of each method
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may serve to clarify how each can be used, or is used, in practice.
3.2.1 Injection Techniques
Hiding information in existing files routinely occurs in common computer
applications. Properties of Microsoft Office documents are automatically recorded
with information specified – perhaps years earlier – when the Office application
was installed. The Author property is automatically culled from the User
Information entry under the Tools/Options menu. Complete safe removal requires
a special tool (http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/help/HA011400341033.aspx).
Information Systems conferences and journals now routinely instruct authors how
to remove identifying information in order not to compromise the blind review
process. More intentionally, information can be invisibly hidden in Web pages by
using the “hidden” tag. The regular view of the webpage does not show the
content, but the source view reveals the <input type="hidden"> tag. Other
examples include storing data in unused space in file headers, data packets sent
over networks, and unused disk space (Johnson et al, 2001). Using open space
without any alteration to the carrier file is very limited in capacity, however.
Therefore, more modern and secure techniques involve some level of modification
of the carrier file.
3.2.2 Substitution Techniques
In substitution techniques, a limited amount of data of the carrier file is replaced
with the coded representation of the hidden message. In techniques involving the
Least Significant Bit (LSB), the binary representation of each picture element
(pixel) in a graphic file is changed to encode the hidden message. This is done such
that the effect on the visual image is negligible. Consider the following color
encoding:
10010101 00001101 11001001
10010110 00001111 11001010
10011111 00010000 11001011
The LSB algorithm can hide the following nine bits 101101101 by changing the
last bit in each octet as needed. This results in
10010101 00001100 11001001
10010111 00001110 11001011
10011111 00010000 11001011
This example demonstrates that to hide nine bits of information, the algorithm only
needs to change four of the nine least significant bits in these nine bytes. Because
changing the last bit causes an extremely small change in the color of a pixel, the
change in the graphic is imperceptible to the human eye. For a more detailed
description
of
this
process,
the
reader
can
visit:
http://www.garykessler.net/library/steganography.html. More complex algorithms
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include Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT), Fourier transformations, and the
Patchwork Method of Bender. In audio files, techniques for information hiding
include replacing the phases of short segments imperceptibly with reference phases
representing the hidden data (phase coding), spreading a narrow band signal of the
message over a wide spectrum of frequencies making it appear as random noise
(spread spectrum encoding), dividing the bandwidth of the carrier into multiple
channels and hopping between these channels (frequency hopping), and many
others.
3.2.3 File Creation
Finally, the stego message can be used to generate a completely new, innocentlooking file. In essence, the message creates its own carrier. An example of this
technique is the application SpamMimic (http://spammimic.com/ ). Using
SpamMimic, a short message can easily be hiding in text that appears to be spam.
This message then can be send to someone who would then use the website to
decode the message. An advantage of this is that few people would be suspicious
of spam messages. The technique is relatively inefficient, as evidenced by the
conversion of the three words “steganography is interesting” to text with a word
count of 574. Full sentences easily balloon to emails with thousands of words.
However, given the advantages of such a method, the word count may be of little
consequence.
3.3 Steganography Encryption Levels
Techniques of steganography can also be distinguished by the level of encryption.
The least secure level, which does not require the exchange of a cipher such as a
stego key, is pure steganography. Effectiveness of keeping the stego message
secure relies only on the ability of the message to remain undetected. Using a
secret stego key prior to communication makes the message more secure, but can
also raise suspicions because exchange of the secret stego key must precede the
transmission of the carrier with the stego message. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between probability of detection on one hand, and the security of the embedded
message if detected. The most secure technique uses a private and a public key to
secure the message embedded in the carrier. The stego message is embedded with
the use of a public key, and the message extracted with a private key. As in public
key encryption, there is no need to exchange keys and therefore the risk of
detection is not increased. It must also be emphasized that the keys in secret key
steganography and public key steganography only serve to augment the execution
of the steganography application, and do not constitute the use of encryption.
A summary of steganography techniques is included as Table 2.

23

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 3(2)
Table 2: Steganography Techniques
Technique

Method

Injection
techniques

Using built-in
information
recording tools or
“open” file space
Part of digital
content of carrier
file changed to
reflect stego
message
Stego message
hidden in larger
amount of new,
irrelevant digital
content
Stego content is
encrypted as it is
included in
carrier file

Substitution
techniques

File creation

Stego encryption

Effect on carrier
file
No change of
content

Some
degradation of
content quality

None- new
carrier file
created

Nome beyond
pure
steganography

Comments
Very limited
hiding capacity

Increased risk of
detection with
increasing
volume of stego
content
Inefficient,
detection risk
highly dependent
on context of
message
Key exchange
increases risk
detection

3.4 File types
Finally, steganography can use different types of files. Until recently, mostly
audiovisual files were used as carrier files for inclusion of stego content. These
files are generally large and have a large image hiding capacity. For instance, the
color of a pixel in an icon can be changed imperceptibly by minimally changing
the digital color code (e.g. from 01011011 01010011 01011001 to 01011010
01010011 01011001), whereas changing a single character in the word 'fat' to 'bat'
is not only noticeable, but also changes the entire meaning of the word.
Incidentally, both are represented by three bytes. As steganography is increasingly
seen as a useful business tool, other file types are now being used as cover files. An
example is the use of steganography for placing identifiers in database
relationships (Agrawal et al, 2003).
4. STEGANALYSIS: DETECTION OF STEGANOGRAPHY:
4.1 Steganalysis
Just as digital technology can be used to hide messages, can it be used to detect and
decode stego messages. Steganalysis is the process of hunting for small deviations
in the expected patterns of a file (Cohen, 2001), so that the presence of hidden
messages can be detected. Steganalysis and steganography are two sides of the
same coin, similar to cryptography and cryptanalysis, and computer viruses and
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antivirus software. Research in steganography involves both developing new
techniques for hiding content and developing new tools for detection and
deciphering of hidden content. This duality is similar to biologic warfare, where
development of new biological weapons goes hand in hand with research of their
antidotes.
4.2 Types of Steganalysis
Based on knowledge of the actual message, availability of the original cover file,
steganography tool, the following types of steganalysis can be distinguished
(Petitcolas, 2000):


Stego only attack - only the stego object is available for analysis;



Known cover attack - the cover and the stego object are both
available;



Known message attack - the message is known and can be compared
with the stego object;



Chosen stego attack - the stego object and the stego tool (algorithm)
are available for analysis;



Chosen message attack - choose a regular message, convert to stego
message for further analysis;



Known stego attack - the stego message, the stego tool (algorithm),
and the cover message are all available for analysis.

In general, steganalysis becomes more efficient and effective as more elements are
known. A further level of complexity is introduced as steganalysis moves from
detection only, to detection and deciphering of the stego message.
4.3 Detection Vectors
Detection of steganography can be based on comparisons of the stego file and the
original file, detection of files having larger than expected file sizes, and variation
in statistical properties of the digital information in the files. Original files are often
not available, unless they come from public sources. However, many
steganography techniques increase the size of the digital carrier file, to the point
that is becomes statistically significant. Moreover, as the structure of the stego
message is superimposed on the digital carrier data, analysis of distribution of
known properties often reveals the presence of the hidden message. For instance,
bitmap files with more than 50 near-identical colors should be suspected of
containing hidden messages (Petitcolas, 2000).
4.4 Destruction vs. Deciphering
Finally, deciphering of stego messages is not always necessary. If the hidden
message can be destroyed before it reaches its destination, the attempt at hidden
communication has effectively been thwarted. Graphical files can be altered by

25

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 3(2)
changing file formats, compression algorithms, and compression levels, usually
without noticeable visible impact on the integrity of the carrier file.
In summary, the detection and deciphering of steganographic content is
complicated and has many challenges. Nevertheless, it is a subject that the security
and legal communities cannot ignore.
5. DIGITAL FORENSICS ISSUES
5.1 Digital Forensics
Digital forensics focuses on the preservation and analysis of digital evidence. As
defined in Palmer (2008), digital forensics are “the use of scientifically derived and
proven methods toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification,
analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital evidence
derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized
actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations.” As steganography becomes
more widely available and the amount of data on local machines and Internet
increases, the issue of detection of the use of steganography by digital forensics
personnel becomes increasingly important. In theory, this should be evaluated in
any type of case involving computer use. In practice, most cases will involve
audiovisual files, such as in child pornography. However, cases of industrial
espionage and fraud could be encountered.
5.2 Approaches in Forensic Steganalysis
Digital Forensic experts employ many techniques, and we will limit the discussion
to those applicable to steganography and steganalysis.
5.2.1 Detection of software
In some cases, steganography software itself may be discovered on computer
equipment under investigation. The Steganography Application Fingerprint
Database (SAFDB) currently contains identifying information on 625 applications
associated with steganography, watermarking, and other data-hiding applications
(Backbone Security, 2008a). Similarly, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) maintains a list of digital signatures in the National Software
Reference Library, some of which are for steganography software. Even when
software has been removed, traces can sometimes be found in places like the
Windows registry or in system backup files. When steganography software
installation has been identified, malicious intent should be assumed until proven
otherwise.
5.2.2 Detecting pairs of carrier files and stego files
In addition to detecting the software used for steganography, digital forensics
experts can detect files with similar visual properties but different file sizes, hash
values, and statistical properties. If files have been deleted, they may be retrieved
from the Recycle Bin or similar Trash container, or even reconstructed with special
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forensics tools for file recovery.
5.2.3 Using Keywords
An additional method of detection uses a list of keywords to search for file names
and content in program files and data files. The list should be specific with regard
to steganography. For instance, the search term “steg*” can be used to identify
steganography. The effectiveness and efficiency in detection, while preventing
false positives and false negatives, depends on the quality of the keyword
dictionary.
5.2.4 Specialized Steganalysis Software
In the past, most steganography detection tools targeted specific applications –
frequently the same applications used for steganography. More recent software
claims to detect stego files created with a wide variety of programs. One of these is
Stegdetect 0.6, which uses linear discriminant analysis to locate probable images
with hidden content by comparing them with a set of normal images (Provos,
2008). A second common tool is Stego Suite (Wetstone Technologies, 2008),
which combines increasingly intense levels of detection with content cracking
tools. The third example is the recent release of StegAnalyzerAS (Backbone
Security, 2008b), which uses the values stored in the SAFDB to identify potential
stego files. A comprehensive list of steganography tools is maintained at
http://www.jjtc.com/Steganography/tools.html.
5.2.5 Physical crime scene investigation
Finally, physical crime scene investigation can reveal useful information.
Passwords used for steganography tools can be written on notes stuck under
keyboards, and environmental objects can generate clues about potential
passwords.
6. DIGITAL SECURITY ISSUES
Though steganography tools may be used for legitimate business applications such
as protecting strategic corporate information during transmission (Schmidt et al,
2004), they have emerged as a significant issue to forensic investigators and others
who are concerned with malicious and illegal uses. As steganography tools
become more widely available and easier to use, protection against malicious use
demands attention, and the balance between protection from illicit use and
interference with legitimate use emerges as a new challenge. In this section, we
will focus on protection against malicious use, and not discuss specific potential
business applications such as watermarking for protection of intellectual property
(discussed above).
6.1 Prevention of Malicious Use
Organizations fight a continuous battle for control over the user desktop.
Employees install unapproved applications such as Instant Messaging clients,
screen savers, and peer-to-peer software if given the opportunity. Likewise,
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employees could install steganography software from repositories such as
JTTC.com (Johnson, 2008). The first lines of defense against these practices are –
as for any unapproved software – company policies and limiting user permissions.
Acceptable use policies should explicitly exclude steganography software, since
users could argue that it does not fall under banned software due to some
legitimate uses.
6.2 Detection of Unauthorized Steganography Software
Unfortunately, not all employees abide by company policy and some are able to
circumvent restricted user permissions. The following measures should be
considered:


Use of network intrusion software to detect abnormal movement of
graphics files. Most business practices do not involve a high level of
graphics file use, and most traffic will be incoming as a result of web
surfing. Outgoing graphics files, whether in isolation or as email
attachments, should be scanned.



Since stego files will not be detected unless they are sought, automatic
scanning of networked computers should be considered. This can be
done with a variety of commercial steganalysis software.



Finally, computers brought in for maintenance or repair should be
routinely scanned for steganography as well as computer viruses and
malware.

Together, these measures will contribute to active identification of illicit
steganography use in the enterprise.
6.3 Steganography as an Organizational Priority
Steganography is but one threat to the security of the enterprise. As with other
security threats (e.g., computer viruses and network intrusion), prevention and
allocation of resources will depend on the perceived relative importance of the
threat. Wingate (2007) describes four typical stakeholder responses:


unaware of the threat. Steganography is typically confused with
shorthand writing (stenography).



denial of the threat. Even some experts fall in this category, as
evidenced by the statement made by Neils Provos to the press:
“Steganography becomes the focus of attention, dies down, and then
the public is all over it again, … But it will never be pervasive,
because the amount of data you can actually hide in the images is
fairly small. And if someone wanted to steal intellectual property, it’d
be easier to copy the data on a disk and carry it out in your pocket.”
(Radcliff, 2002).
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resignation. Stakeholders typically state that nothing can be done
about steganography due to a lack of good tools for detection and
information extraction.



perception of steganography as a legitimate threat. Wingate (2007)
falls in this category: “A comprehensive enterprise security program
should include countermeasures to the threat posed by insider use of
steganograhpy. The first step is to acknowledge the threat exists by
developing and implementing policy to prohibit users from having
steganography applications on their workstations. Finally, both
passive and active detection tools and techniques should be employed
to enforce the ‘no steg policy.’”

Users are encouraged to form their own opinion about the relevance and extent of
the threat of steganography.
7. LEGAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Laws involving technology are difficult to enact and even more difficult to enforce
in the Internet age. Many Internet communications cross state lines and
international borders, which creates the issue of jurisdiction. What may be illegal
in one jurisdiction may be legal in another. In 1952, the United States enacted
Section 1343 of the Federal Criminal Code. It included a wire fraud provision,
which was later extended to encompass the Internet. Using any part of the
telecommunications system in a criminal act is now a federal offense (Cole, 2003).
Court orders must be obtained from a judge to monitor phone conversations, but
the order applies to a specific phone number only. Criminals can easily bypass this
by using disposable cell phones (Charny, 2003). Other new technologies, such as
the voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), pose new challenges. Internet Telephony
breaks phone conversations into data packets, sends them over the Internet, and
reassembles them at the destination. To monitor this traffic, a few central locations
would have to be set up where voice streams could be diverted and then be copied
before resending them to the intended destination (Wired News, 2003). It would be
much more effective to monitor right after the starting point when packets are not
separated over different routes or right before the destination, when all packets
follow a single path.
7.1 Privacy vs. Security
A delicate balance exists between loss of personal privacy and the greater good of
society. Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) are opposing law
enforcement monitoring of communications. The ACLU’s position on privacy and
technology is that the United States is at risk of becoming a surveillance society.
Two concurrent developments form the basis for this trend (American Civil
Liberties Union, 2003):
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The tremendous explosion in surveillance-enabling technologies.
George Orwell’s vision of ‘Big Brother’ has now become
technologically possible.



Even as this technological surveillance monster grows in our midst,
we are [weakening] the legal restraints that keep it from trampling our
privacy.

Another problem is the risk of unintended consequences of any new legislation.
For example, a Michigan state law enacted March 31, 2003, based on the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and originally intended to protect cable TV
operators and broadband providers, contained the provision “A person shall not
assemble, develop, manufacture, possess, deliver, or use any type
telecommunications access device by doing, but not limited to, any of the
following: ... (b) Conceal the existence or place of origin or destination of any
telecommunications service” (Act 328 of 1931, 2004). The law had to be amended
in 2004 because in its original form, the legitimate use of technologies, such as
steganography, was clearly prohibited. Likewise, some information gathered by
authorities could be used for illegitimate purposes.
Recently, the U.S. government has tried to gain more access to communications
and restrict the use of encryption technology. Similar to the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) in the United States, the
European Parliament implemented the Communications Data Protection Directive
in 2003. European member states can order telecommunications companies to
store all electronic communications, including phone calls, e-mails, and Internet
use, for indefinite periods. In general though, the European Union is more
permissive with regard to specific technologies to hide data. Neither the United
States nor the European Union has enacted laws restricting the use of
steganography specifically, and it is unlikely that legal restrictions on the use of
steganography will be implemented. Laws restricting the use of cryptography have
existed for years (Koops, 2007), while legal limits on the use of steganography
have yet to be implemented. Moreover, the potential thwarting of criminal
activities may not outweigh the loss of privacy.
7.2 International Travel
Finally, though steganography may not be illegal, even the possession could be
cause for alarm in some parts of the world. International travelers, including
business travelers, should realize that unhidden coded messages, no matter how
unbreakable, will arouse suspicion and may in themselves be incriminating in
countries where encryption is illegal. If hidden digital messages would be found,
the owner of the equipment could be in similar legal trouble abroad. The
possession and use of steganography should therefore be considered very carefully.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Steganography has a long history of both legitimate and illicit uses (Schmidt et
al, 2004). With rapid development and improvements of information
technology, the potential for use and abuse will continue to increase. Some
legitimate uses exist, but the focus has been predominantly on detection of
abuse and illicit use.
Legal restrictions are difficult to enforce, therefore Information Technology
(IT) staff charged with organizational security should act proactively by
seeking management support to limit or banish use of steganography that has
no distinct organizational benefit. The specifics of the limitations should be
incorporated as an integral part of the organizational policies and procedures,
and should be actively enforced. If a ban on all steganographic software is not
possible or desirable, specific exceptions of applications, individuals, and/or
job categories allowed to use the software should be explicitly specified. To
foster active prevention, managers must establish organizational policies which
discourage or ban the use of steganography. Furthermore, these policies must
be instantiated with specific procedures and guidelines that are communicated
to all employees and other stakeholders during initial and ongoing routine
Security Awareness, Training, and Education (SATA) programs. Compliance
with these policies and procedures must be actively enforced as part of the
organizational IT governance mechanisms. Networked computers can be
actively scanned for steganographic software, similar to scanning for computer
malware infections and scanning for proper software versions and patches.
Network traffic can be scanned as it enters and leaves the organizational
network boundaries, similar to scanning for email security threats. Finally,
Technical Support staff can be instructed in identification of banned software,
as well as the proper organizational procedures when it is found.
In cases of steganography uses in crimes or organizational espionage, where
law enforcement investigators or organizational IT staff members
(respectively) may lack the specific expertise, managers should consider
bringing in the expertise of digital forensics professionals. Recommendations
for specific steganalysis tools are likely to become rapidly stale as technology
progresses, but a good starting point for selecting the proper tools could be to
start with the major commercial steganalysis vendors in combination with the
information in the Steganography Application Fingerprint Database and the
National Software Reference Library. Together, these sources would provide
optimal capability to detect and possibly decipher steganographic content. In
any case, law enforcement and IT staff should consider that steganography
may have advanced too far to be handled by non-security specialists, and that
the specialized services of digital forensics professionals may be needed.
Finally, individual users should consider that the steganography technology has
advanced well beyond the use by amateur enthusiasts, and that the mere
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presence of steganographic software on their computers could have serious
professional and private ramifications. Users should be aware of and stay
within the restrictions of corporate policies and procedures, as well as legal
limitations on possession and use of steganography software. When traveling
abroad with steg software installed, the legal limitations of destination
countries should be investigated.
Steganography also presents new challenges for digital forensic investigators,
security personnel, enterprise managers, law enforcement officials, courts, and
lawmakers. It will add to the complexity and quantity of the digital forensic
workload, security measures, and development of case law. Future research of
steganography and steganalysis should be encouraged for both academics and
practitioners.
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